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 Constructing
 Turkey's "western"
 identity during the
 Cold War
 Discourses of the intellectuals of statecraft
 Throughout the republican era, membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions
 has provided Turkey's policymakers with the opportunity to assert the coun-
 try's "western" identity. Indeed, Turkey's "westernness" has been expressed,
 not only through the adoption of ideas and manners from the west (as hap-
 pened in Ottoman times), but also through joining western institutions,
 such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is one of the
 reasons why the US project of promoting democracy in the greater Middle
 East is received with enthusiasm by some in Ankara. Notwithstanding the
 concerns of those who worry that taking an active part in this project would
 undermine the carefully constructed role Islam plays in shaping political
 processes in Turkey, others seem to consider this scheme an opportunity to
 entrench Turkey's position within NATO and (re)assert its western identity.1
 Eylem Yilmaz holds an MA in international relations from Bilkent University. Pinar
 Bilgin is assistant professor of international relations at Bilkent University in Ankara. The
 authors would like to acknowledge financial support provided by the department of inter-
 national relations at Bilkent University and to thank Umit Cizre and Bilge Crissfor their
 helpful comments.
 1 "Sezer'in 'Ilimh Islam' Tepkisi" [Sezer's reaction to "moderate Islam"], Milliyet, 15 April 2004;
 and "Turkiye'nin Degeri 2004'te Artacak" [Turkey's value will increase in 2004], Milliyet, 23
 February 2004.
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 Leaving aside the somewhat paradoxical nature of seeking to assert
 western identity through posing as a model for the Middle East, what
 should be emphasized here is the first premise of this article: that state
 identity in Turkey and elsewhere "is always potentially precarious, it needs
 constantly to be stabilized or (re)produced."2 It is through the representa-
 tional practices of state and nonstate actors (including policymakers, schol-
 ars, and journalists) that state identity is produced and/or reproduced.
 Such representational practices include state officials' discourses on a par-
 ticular foreign policy issue, scholarly writings on lands far away, writings
 and speeches of policy makers and journalists, geopolitical discourses of
 myriad actors, and even popular film.3
 A second premise of the article is that what makes foreign policy (i.e.,
 relations between states) possible is a political practice that makes certain
 events and actors "foreign," that is, the politics of exclusion and inclusion,
 processes of constituting particular objects as part of "them" (foreign), and
 other objects as part of "us." Viewed as such, representational practices
 constitute a significant component of the process of making something for-
 eign. Foreign policy practices of states, in turn, "reproduce the constitution
 of identity made possible by [the foreign policy practices of states] and... con-
 tain challenges to the identity which results."4 Stated with reference to
 Turkey's case, representational practices of various actors have constructed
 Turkey's identity as western as opposed to eastern. After defining itself and
 others, Turkey's foreign policy has been conducted upon these specific
 actors. Such diplomatic conduct, in turn, has helped to (re)produce
 Turkey's western identity and has sustained a pro-western orientation.
 2 Jutta Weldes, "The cultural production of crises: US identity and missiles in Cuba," in jutta
 Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall, eds., Cultures of Insecurity: States,
 Communities and the Production of Danger (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
 1999). 59-
 3 See, for example, Weldes, "The cultural production of crises," 35-62; Edward W. Said,
 Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979): Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters (Minneapolis:
 University of Minnesota Press, 1996): Gear6id 0 Tuathail and Simon Dalby, eds., Rethinking
 Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 1998), and Weldes, "Going cultural: Star Trek, state action and
 popular culture," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 28: 1 (1999): 117-34.
 4 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity
 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 76.
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 The significance of NATO membership to Turkey's claim to belong to
 the west cannot be overemphasized. The efforts of Turkish policymakers to
 locate Turkey in the west as opposed to non-west can be traced back to the
 early republican era when westernization became one of the cornerstones of
 Kemal Ataturk's foreign and domestic policies. In the aftermath of the
 Second World War, this policy was pursued through the search for US assis-
 tance (which came in the form of the Truman doctrine in 1947) and its insti-
 tutionalization in the form of NATO membership. Later still, Turkey began
 to pursue membership in the European Economic Community, now the
 European Union, a goal that is still a keystone of the country's foreign policy.
 Joining NATO in the early Cold War era proved difficult not least
 because of considerable suspicion regarding Turkey's commitment to west-
 ern security - a suspicion that was raised by Ankara's decision to remain
 outside the Second World War. Although that decision had served Turkey's
 purpose at the time, it was not without ramifications for its postwar rela-
 tions. Writing in 1947, five years before it acceded to the Atlantic alliance,
 Ambassador Cevat A^ikahn sought to offset such suspicions by reminding
 the readers of International Affairs, the flagship journal of the Royal
 Institute of International Affairs, of the country's contribution to the allied
 war effort:
 [A]t a moment when the Allies were in great difficulties, Turkey
 played the role of a temporary shield behind which the Russians
 and the British were able to use their forces more freely against the
 aggressors in various theatres of operations.5
 Accordingly, Ankara's decision to send troops to Korea and various
 attempts to cooperate with the United States and Great Britain in the set-
 ting up of a regional security organization in the Middle East could all be
 considered attempts to reestablish Turkey's credibility as a reliable partner.
 This was underscored by Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft who, through
 their writings, pointed to Turkey's contribution to western security, thereby
 helping to locate their country firmly in the west. During the Cold War, rep-
 resentations of Turkey as a "junior partner" of the United States in the fight
 against communism helped to produce and reproduce its western identity,
 which was perceived to be very precarious at the time.
 5 Cevat A91I0I in, "Turkey's International Relations," International Affairs 23:4 (1947): 485.
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 By looking at the writings of Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft, this arti-
 cle seeks to point to how their representational practices contributed to
 Turkey's western identity throughout the Cold War. Intellectuals of state-
 craft are understood as those formal theorists and practitioners who have
 participated in the discursive construction of state identity through their
 writings on the foreign and security policy problems faced by the govern-
 ment of the day. Although it is "state officials who are granted the right,
 who have the authority, to define security and insecurity... they are often
 assisted by what have been called 'intellectuals of statecraft/ Less influen-
 tial than state officials, their representational practices are nevertheless
 powerful - by virtue of their expertise on foreign and security policy
 issues - in that they enjoy the power to define and thus to constitute the
 world."6 In other words, these intellectuals do not often directly shape for-
 eign policy decisions of the Turkish state, but they contribute to the shap-
 ing of the foreign and security agenda through defining what is and is not
 a security problem.
 The argument this article seeks to introduce is that through their writ-
 ings on Turkey's membership within NATO as a western institution,
 Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft did not merely describe their country's
 Cold War search for security. They also participated in the construction of
 Turkey's western identity. Such writings are never politically neutral; they
 help to constitute the world in their own image. Yet, at the same time, the
 authors deny their works' interpretative status, for they "claim to re-present
 effortlessly the drama of international politics as an intelligible spectacle
 without interpretation."7 For example, the editor of the Ankara journal
 Foreign Policy maintains that this publication provides "objective analysis
 of foreign policy issues both to Turkish and foreign readers."8 This state-
 ment, in itself, constitutes a good example of what is being problematized
 6 The term "intellectuals of statecraft" is from Gear6id 6 Tuathail and John Agnew,
 "Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy,"
 Political Geography n: 2 (1992): 190-204.
 7 Tuathail and Dalby, "Introduction: Rethinking geopolitics, towards a critical geopolitics," in
 Tuathail and Dalby, eds., Rethinking Geopolitics, 6.
 8 Seyfi Ta§han, "Foreign Policy Institute, its 25™ anniversary," in Bulletin for the 25th
 Anniversary of the Foreign Policy Institute (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1999). Seyfi Ta§han
 is the founding president of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute and the editor of the journal
 Foreign Policy.
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 here - that is, the claim to represent the world as seen through the ostensi-
 bly objective lenses of the security intellectual. By way of analyzing the writ-
 ings of Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft, this article seeks to point to the
 "self-constituting politics"9 of such writings. That is to say, the aim here is
 not to uncover what individual experts really believed or to decipher their
 real intentions, but to point to how these texts are "linked with a wide array
 of discourses and representational practices"10 that contributed to the
 (re)production of Turkey's western identity during that era. It is this iden-
 tity that enabled a pro-western foreign policy during the Cold War and
 helped justify Turkey remaining within NATO even after the USSR retreat-
 ed from its early demands (which included the return of two of Turkey's
 eastern provinces and granting of bases on the Turkish Straits), or during
 detente (when there was greater room for manoeuver for smaller states,
 such as Turkey).
 A caveat is in order: the texts looked at for the purposes of this article
 are articles published in the quarterly journal Di§ Politika/ Foreign Policy,
 the in-house journal of the Foreign Policy Institute, which is Turkey's old-
 est independent think tank specializing on foreign and security policy
 issues." Foreign Policy is the second oldest journal in Turkey specializing
 in international affairs. We chose to look at Foreign Policy as opposed to
 the oldest journal, the annual Turkish Yearbook of International Relations,
 because the Yearbook only publishes the works of academics, whereas con-
 tributors to Foreign Policy have, over the years, included ministers of for-
 eign affairs, diplomats, bureaucrats, and military officials, as well as schol-
 ars of political science, international relations and economics. The articles
 published in the journal are thus more representative of the views of the
 country's intellectuals of statecraft. The articles examined in this paper
 were published after 1974, when the journal began, and in the aftermath
 of the crisis created by the US military embargo. In that political context,
 the importance to Turkey of membership in NATO could not be taken for
 granted and had to be defended. Our conclusions, therefore, are limited
 to the post-1974 era. We have not attempted to point to any continuities
 9 6 Tuathail and Dalby, "Introduction," in Tuathail and Dalby, eds., Rethinking Geopolitics, 1.
 10 Doty, Imperial Encounters, 147.
 n See 30 Years of Foreign Policy: A Summary of the Work of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute
 and Its Publications, 1974-2004 (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004).
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 or discontinuities with the early years of the Cold War, when there was less
 domestic criticism of the relationship with NATO and the United States, or
 with the post-Cold War era. What is more interesting for the purpose of
 this article is to examine how Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft chose to
 represent issues related to the country's security at a time when member-
 ship in NATO and a close alliance with the US were under considerable
 domestic criticism.
 In what follows, an analysis of the writings of Turkey's intellectuals of
 statecraft is presented to make two interrelated points. First, in these writ-
 ings, NATO was represented not only as a military, but also as a cultural
 organization manifesting a western identity. This, in turn, contributed to
 the discursive (re)production of Turkey's western identity. Second, this
 tendency played a significant role in the self-perception of Turkey as a mod-
 ern and democratic western state, as distinct from the "non-western," "tra-
 ditional," "underdeveloped," or "non-democratic" states of the eastern bloc.
 The Cold War insecurity that Turkey was settled within was not an objective
 and natural situation, but a social and cultural production. The country's
 intellectuals of statecraft did not merely describe Ankara's Cold War search
 for security, but also contributed to the production and reproduction of its
 state identity as western, which, in turn, constituted a cornerstone of
 Turkey's pro-western security policies. The focal points of this article are,
 therefore, the "representations of danger"12 in the writings of Turkey's intel-
 lectuals of statecraft; how they shared a common discourse during the Cold
 War; and the ways in which politics of representation were instrumental in
 (re)inscribing westernness into Turkey's identity.
 NATO AS A CULTURAL ALLIANCE
 NATO was formed after the Second World War as a collective defence
 organization. In 1952, Turkey joined the Atlantic alliance, serving in the
 southern flank as a counterweight to the Soviet threat. As well as helping
 to secure Turkey against Soviet expansionism, the country's membership in
 NATO has also constituted one of the milestones in the multifaceted efforts
 to locate Turkey in the west. As Ali Karaosmanoglu has argued,
 beyond the Soviet threat after the Second World War, Turkey's deci-
 siveness in joining NATO derived mostly from a profound belief in
 12 Campbell, Writing Security.
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 Western values and in the virtues of Western political systems.
 NATO membership solidified Ankara's Western orientation by
 establishing a long-lasting institutional and functional link with
 the West.13
 The central point of this passage is that by promoting the alliance as the
 champion of western strategic identity, Turkey's policy makers added a cul-
 tural dimension to NATO. Identifying a cultural dimension to NATO mem-
 bership is not to suggest that Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft were alone
 in doing so. On the contrary, as Michael Williams and Iver Neumann have
 shown, various Cold War narratives on NATO portrayed the organization as
 the "military guarantor of Western civilization," the coherence of which
 rested upon not only resisting the common Soviet threat, but also on cul-
 tural and civilizational ties.14 Indeed, NATO's narrative included "[cjlaims
 about the cultural and political nature of the Alliance."15 It is a point pre-
 sented clearly in the preamble of the Washington treaty (1949), in which
 the signatories described themselves as "determined to safeguard the free-
 dom, common heritage and civilization of other peoples, founded upon
 principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."16 As
 Williams and Neumann have maintained, NATO was represented as the
 manifestation of a broad cultural context uniting member-states who
 shared common cultural and normative traits. As a result, NATO did not
 merely function as a collective defence organization but also helped to con-
 stitute its members' particular identities by marking their differences from
 those states that belonged to the east. Viewed as such, Turkey was one of
 many NATO member-states that (re)produced their western identity
 13 Ali L Karaosmanoglu, "The evolution of the national security culture and the military in
 Turkey," Journal of International Affairs 54: 1 (2000): 209.
 14 Michael Williams and Iver Neumann, "From alliance to security community: NATO, Russia
 and the power of identity," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29:2 (2000): 361. This
 is not meant to de-emphasize the role played by the Soviet threat in the formation of NATO.
 Rather, the point is that NATO, once formed, was kept together, not only by means of threat
 politics (i.e. with reference to Soviet expansionist tendencies), but also through resort to vari-
 ous representational practices that emphasized the cultural ties. See, for example, "Report of
 the committee of the three on nonmilitary cooperation in NATO," (approved by the North
 Atlantic Council in December 1956), www.nato.int.
 15 Williams and Neumann, "From alliance to security community," 367.
 16 NATO, "North Atlantic treaty," Brussels, 1949, www.nato.int.
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 through underlining differences with non-members. The Cold War was
 represented as a conflict not only between the two superpowers, but one
 encompassing broader "groupings of states... the 'West' and the 'East'." It
 was through interaction of the two sides and representations of these inter-
 actions that the identities and threats to these identities were defined. It
 was the "ordering of terms, meanings, and practices" that established and
 maintained the categories of friend/enemy, west/east and communist/
 democratic,17 and reinforced the confrontational relationship that was the
 Cold War.
 JOINING THE WEST THROUGH THE KOREAN WAR EFFORT
 Along with other Western states, Turkey sent troops to support the United
 Nations effort in Korea (1950-53), which became the battleground between
 the east and the west. As was mentioned earlier, the intervention was not
 merely a military operation but was also "a cultural process of collective
 identity formation."18 With hindsight, it has become a symbolic act that
 helped to constitute western collective identity in opposition to the socialist
 other(s) in the east. Writing more than three decades after the event, Yulug
 Tekin Kurat chose to represent Turkey's participation in the Korean War in
 the following terms:
 [T]he prominent members of the Turkish government... decided to
 take part in the Korean War. In the first place Turkey had taken
 such a decision in response to the appeal of the United Nations to
 safeguard the integrity and independence of South Korea in accor-
 dance with the principles of the [UN] Charter.... But behind this
 decision Turkish aspirations for joining the Atlantic Alliance were
 also in mind. It was because the theatre of war in Korea prepared
 the ground for the Turkish forces to set an example for their fight-
 ing ability with the up to date weapons.19
 17 Jennifer Milliken, "Intervention and identity: Reconstructing the west in Korea," in Weldes et
 al., eds., Cultures of Insecurity, 92.
 18 Ibid., 91.
 19 Yulug Tekin Kurat, "Turkey's entry to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," Foreign Policy
 10: 3-4 (1983): 74. See also Huseyin Bagci, "Turkiye'nin NATO Uyeligini Hizlandiran Iki Onem-
 li Faktor: Kore Savasi ve ABD Buyukelcisi George McGhee," [Two factors that precipitated
 Turkey's membership in NATO: The Korean War and US Ambassador George McGhee], ODTU
 Celisme Dergis'nZ: 1/2 (1991): 1-35.
 I 46 I International Journal | Winter 2005-2006 |
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.98 on Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:23:16 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 I Constructing Turkey's "western" identity during the Cold War |
 These words point to two "logics of appropriateness"20 for Turkey's par-
 ticipation in the Korean War. First, defending the independence of a sov-
 ereign state is presented as the appropriate behaviour for a member of the
 United Nations, since complying with the stipulations of the UN Charter is
 the relevant norm. As a member of the UN, Turkey's external behaviour
 can, therefore, be considered to have been constrained by the normative
 structure of the UN system. Furthermore, Turkey's interests and identity
 were, it is argued, informed by the widely held international norms of the
 UN, which guided the state along certain socially prescribed channels of
 what is considered "appropriate" state behaviour. Accordingly, for Kurat,
 Turkey's reason for participation in the Korean intervention is represented
 as an attempt to secure its identity as a respectable member of the interna-
 tional community represented by the UN.
 The same logic is observed in an article by Haluk Bayiilken, former
 representative of Turkey to the UN (1969-1971), where he noted that his
 country advocated "the supremacy of the principle of sovereign equality of
 all peace loving states," which constituted the basis of the UN Charter and
 that it "has never lost her faith in the ideals and principles of the Charter."
 Ambassador Bayiilken went on to justify Turkey's joining the Korean War
 effort with reference to its identity as a "reliable" UN member state:
 [t]his belief of Turkey in the ideals embodied in the Charter was a
 major factor deciding Turkey's position in the Korean War.... It was
 the adaptation of. .[the UN] resolution which enabled the United
 Nations to send forces to Korea.21
 In this way, Bayiilken explained Turkey's military participation on the
 grounds that there had been "an act of aggression" and a "breach of peace"
 in Korea, which necessitated UN intervention.
 Equally interesting, the second "logic of appropriateness" observed in
 the passage from the article by Kurat quoted above is that Turkey's partici-
 pation in the Korean War was represented as appropriate conduct for a
 20 On the "logic of appropriateness," see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,
 "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52: 4 (1998):
 887-917.
 21 0. Haluk Bayulken, "Turkey and the United Nations," Foreign Policy 1: 3 (1971): 100-103.
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 western state. Writing in the late 1970s, Professor Metin Tamko? repre-
 sented the decision as,
 an opportunity for [President] Bayar to demonstrate his strong
 desire for solidarity within the West. He decided to send a contin-
 gent of 5,000 troops to Korea. The immediate dividend of this
 investment was the association of Turkey with NATO."
 It is interesting to note that almost three decades after the Korean War
 a discourse of 'duties' was employed to explain why Turkey sent troops to
 Korea. In doing this, Turkey's action was represented as that of a state that
 adhered to principles of sovereign equality, collective security and interna-
 tional justice. In Tamko^'s analysis, these were interpreted as norms con-
 stitutive of the west. Accordingly, sending troops to Korea was considered
 as not only a military strategic decision but also as a symbolic act demon-
 strating Turkey's dedication to international law and western norms. In
 another article published in 1974 by Turan Giine§, the foreign minister at
 the time, NATO membership itself was also represented as signifying com-
 mitment to western values such as "democracy, respect for human rights,
 social progress and justice."23 In the writings of the intellectuals of state-
 craft, Turkey was represented as pursuing a policy consistent with the poli-
 cies of other western states by virtue of its support for the UN operation in
 Korea. By participating in the Korean War , Turkey was considered to have
 acted in conformity with the norms constitutive of a western state identity.
 THE SOVIET UNION AS TURKEY'S "OTHER"
 In 1945, the USSR made three demands on Turkey in return for renewing
 the Turco-Soviet friendship pact of 1925. These were the return of the
 provinces of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviet Union, granting of bases on
 the Turkish Straits, and the revision of the Montreux convention (1936) to
 enable greater Soviet control over the sea traffic in and out of the Black Sea.
 In the scholarly literature on Turkish foreign policy, the relatively tense rela-
 tions between Turkey and the USSR in the immediate postwar era, the
 22 Metin Tamkog, "The impact of the Truman doctrine on the national security interests of
 Turkey," Foreign Policy 6: 3/4 (1977): 29.
 23 Turan Cune§, "Changing world conditions, NATO and Turkey," Foreign Policy 9:1 (1974): 65.
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 promulgation of the Truman doctrine (1947), and the subsequent applica-
 tion of Turkey to join NATO are mostly associated with these demands on
 Turkish territories.24 In the writings of Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft,
 however the Soviet threat was extended further back in history and has been
 presented a foundational threat to the Turkish republic. Consider the fol-
 lowing excerpt from an analysis of the Truman doctrine published in 1977:
 Ever since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish
 leaders Atatiirk and Inonii had considered the Turco-Soviet rela-
 tions as the bedrock of Turkish foreign policy. Ever mindful of the
 territorial designs of the Soviets on Turkey and the Soviet drive
 toward the Mediterranean and Middle East, Atatiirk and Inonii saw
 to it that Turkey did not remain isolated against the Soviet Union.
 To that end they established friendly relations with the major
 powers of Europe.25
 The author's words trace the history of strained relations between the
 Soviet Union and Turkey back to the early years of the modern republic.
 This is not to suggest that the Soviet Union was not considered a threat
 to Turkey's security in the early republican era by the policymakers at that
 time. The issue here is not whether the USSR constituted a foundational
 threat or not. More important is the fact that it was represented as such by
 Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft long after the events that gave rise to the
 perception of a threat, and that this threat was read backwards into the his-
 tory predating the events described in those writings. In this vein, consid-
 er the following excerpt from an article by General Necip Torumtay, where
 the author directly links Turkish-Soviet relations during earlier periods with
 the Turkish decision to join NATO:
 24 In 1949, and again in 1950, Turkey's policymakers informed the US and British ambassadors
 in Ankara of their desire to join NATO. This is not to underestimate the role domestic factors
 played in shaping the decision to join NATO. See, e.g., A. Haluk Ulman and Oral Sander, "Turk
 Dis, Politikasma Yon Veren Etkenler (1923-1968) - II," [Factors shaping Turkish foreign policy
 (1923-68) - II], A.U.S.B.F. Dergisi (1972): 1-24; and Faruk Sonmezoglu, "II. Dunya Savasj
 DonemindeTurkiye'nin Dis, Politikasi: "Tarafsizlik"tan NATO'ya'" [Turkey's foreign policy during
 the Second World War: From "neutrality" to NATO], in Faruk Sonmezoglu, ed., Turk Di§
 Politikasinin Analizi [Analysis of Turkish foreign policy] (Istanbul: Der Yayinlari, 1994), 79-89.
 25 Tamkoc, "The impact of the Truman doctrine," 19.
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 [the] Soviet Union's refusal to renew the Treaty of Friendship,
 Neutrality and Non-Aggression of 1925, the tension caused by
 demands on the Turkish Straits and territorial claims from Eastern
 Anatolia immediately after World War II and the ensuing defense
 requirements required Turkey to look for new arrangements for its
 security apart from neutrality. This quest has (sic) ended in 1952
 when Turkey joined NATO.26
 It is interesting to note here that such parallels with the pre-Cold War
 period were not drawn in the early years of the Cold War. Take, for exam-
 ple, the article cited earlier by A^ikalm, in which the author pointed to
 Turkey's contributions to the Allies' war effort. In that article, published in
 1947, the author chose to represent the Soviet demands on Turkey's terri-
 tories as reactions to Ankara's decision to remain outside the Second World
 War and not necessarily as an instance of historical Soviet enmity against
 Turkey.27
 Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft maintained this discourse of the
 early-Cold War years during the early 1970s, an era characterized by the
 emergence of detente in east-west relations. Despite this, writing in 1974,
 Admiral Sezai Orkunt emphasized the continuity of Turkey's policy towards
 the Soviet Union. He wrote:
 Turkey had joined the North Atlantic Alliance as a result of the
 Soviet demand for military bases on the Turkish Straits. This
 demand is one that would entirely destroy Turkish independence.
 There is, as yet, no change in the conditions to lead Turkey to think
 otherwise.28
 Here, the territorial demands of the Soviets are represented as the
 major reason behind Turkey's initial request for cooperation with the west-
 ern states and NATO. These demands are understood as not merely terri-
 torial demands but as threats to Turkish independence and the author, a
 senior military officer, argued that the conditions that were present at the
 outset of the Cold War continued into the 1970s. Ambassador Muharrem
 26 Necip Torumtay, "Turkey's military doctrine," Foreign Policy 15:1/2 (1991): 20.
 27 See Acikalin, "Turkey's International Relations."
 28 Sezai Orkunt, "The interalliance relationship and Turkey," Foreign Policy 4: 1 (1974): 87. See
 also Bayulken, "Turkey and the United Nations," 99.
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 Nuri Birgi expressed the continuing immanence of the Soviet threat in
 equally certain terms:
 the frightening scale of increase in Soviet arms, their establish-
 ments of naval superiority in all areas... their activities for creating
 division among the allies and... for destroying every one of
 them.. .should be considered as evidences... that the danger of
 Soviet invasion is [not] over.29
 Without wanting to read too much into the author's words, it is worth
 noting here that while the article was published during the era of detente,
 it was also a time of increasing tension in Turkey's relations with its west-
 ern allies due to the Cyprus problem - that is, at a time when Turkey's deci-
 sion to remain within NATO required justification.
 Given the historical juncture at which they were published, such writ-
 ings constituted attempts to uphold a particular narrative about the "other"
 (i.e., the Soviet Union) in order to sustain a particular account of the "self
 (i.e., Turkey). As Thomas Banchoff argues, "[tjhrough narratives, the roots
 of a state's relations with other states and institutions and their present sit-
 uations are depicted. In this manner, the narrative defines 'who we are' by
 way of articulating 'where we have been'."30 To uphold a narrative means to
 sustain a particular account of the self. Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft
 chose to locate the enduring character of Turkey's westernness with refer-
 ence to the "enduring" threat posed by the USSR. So long as this narrative
 made sense, this identity could be sustained in the public domain. It might
 even be argued - although it can never be proven - that without reference
 to the threat from the east, locating Turkey in the west would have been
 more difficult, notwithstanding the commitment of the Kemalist elite to
 Turkey's westernisation. The perpetuation of the master narrative of the
 Cold War - that represented the Soviet Union as the other - helped to
 (re)produce Turkey's western identity. It also justified, in part, Turkey's con-
 tinuing cooperation with the west even when Ankara's relations with its
 NATO allies deteriorated, such as after the arms embargo imposed by the
 29 Muharrem Nuri Birgi, "Developments within the Atlantic community and Turkey," Foreign
 Po//c/3:4(i973):73-
 30 Thomas Banchoff, "German identity and European integration," European Journal of
 International Relations 5: 3 (1999): 270.
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 United States in the 1970s, or when relations with the USSR improved as
 happened during detente.
 NATO AS A COMMUNITY OF VALUES
 In the pages of an important journal such as Foreign Policy, NATO was rep-
 resented not merely as a defensive alliance but also as a cultural alliance, a
 community that manifested the common values shared by its members.
 Consider the following excerpt from an article by Kamran Inan, a former
 ambassador and member of the Turkish national assembly, published in
 1974:
 Our membership in NATO is, first of all, an important stride in
 our westernization movement. We have obtained a place and a say
 within the Atlantic community. The frontiers of Europe now begin
 from Eastern Turkey. In the context of our historical development,
 this constitutes an important achievement and a milestone. In this
 world of ours that has been made smaller due to advances ^...tech-
 nology, nations are compelled to come together and form solidari-
 ty groups.... [T]he countries which have similar political systems,
 and close values and views of life and common interests [sic] gen-
 erally come together. The cooperation... grows in time and creates
 an atmosphere of community. This has been the case in NATO.31
 Here, NATO is presented as a community, membership in which is
 considered a cultural as well as a military undertaking. Aside from recog-
 nizing NATO's military role, the author has emphasized the important
 political nature of the organization. Such a view was not uncommon. One
 sees a similar perspective in an article by Osman Okay, the minister of for-
 eign affairs at the time of its publication:
 [A]ny analysis of our relations with the Western countries
 should...take into account the traditional aspects of these relations
 which are rooted in our historical evolution in the economic, polit-
 ical and military fields reflecting our treaty commitments, the
 requirements of our geographical locations and our way of life and
 31 Inan, "Turkey and NATO," 72.
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 democratic purposes.... The North Atlantic Alliance constitutes a
 framework which provides the means for conducting our coopera-
 tion with the Western countries in the areas of security and foreign
 policy in an effective way and on the basis of mutual respect and
 interests.32
 Likewise, writing in 1977, Ambassador Ismail Soysal underlined how
 NATO membership signified Turkey's place in western civilization.33
 Turkish authors made the connection between NATO and the west
 because the alliance was viewed as representing common cultural and nor-
 mative traits rooted in "democracy and respect of human rights, social
 progress and justice."34 Turan Gune§ identified what he saw as core NATO
 values, such as dedication to western ideals, democracy, human rights,
 social progress and rule of law. In a sense, Turkey's intellectuals of state-
 craft presented NATO membership not merely as membership in a collec-
 tive defence organization but as a means of political identification. That is,
 membership in the alliance was viewed as proof of the commonalities
 among the western Allies in terms of behavioural traits as well as values.
 As such, NATO is conceived not merely as a military alliance standing
 against the Soviet threat, but also as an instrument of western civilization.
 Against the backdrop of the Soviet threat, NATO membership assisted the
 modern Republic of Turkey in locating itself firmly in the west in general
 and in Europe in particular.
 TURKEY'S COLD WAR IDENTITY: ROLE CONSTRUCTIONS
 An analysis of statements by Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft ascribing to
 Turkey a particular role identity in opposition to the Soviet Union's count-
 er-role shows how Ankara's role within NATO shaped foreign policy.
 Consider, for example another excerpt from the article by Inan:
 Turkey has occupied an important role [in NATO] and made
 important contributions [to peace as a deterrent force]. If Turkey
 today is represented at the European Security and Cooperation
 32 Osman Okay, "Turkey's foreign policy," Foreign Policy 1:2 (1971): 80.
 33 Ismail Soysal, "The influence of the concept of western civilization on Turkish foreign policy,"
 Foreign Policy 6: 3/4 (1977): 3-6-
 34 Turan Gune§, "Changing world conditions, NATO, and Turkey," Foreign Policy 4: 1 (1974): 65.
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 Conference in Geneva, and at the Mutual and Balanced Force
 Reduction Conference in Vienna and has a word in these confer-
 ences and gained the opportunity to defend its national interests,
 this is the result of our membership in NATO.
 Our collaboration in the military field has been to the advan-
 tage of all parties and has proved to be beneficial for peace. The
 determination and decision of all powers to react jointly against
 common danger has preserved peace and has created the most
 powerful deterrent force in the world.35
 NATO membership, he argued, did not only grant Turkey a say in inter-
 national forums, but also rendered it an indispensable partner for the pro-
 tection of peace.36
 This concern with the projection of strength is not only directed beyond
 Turkey's border; there is also a domestic component. Turkey is no longer
 viewed, as it was not so long ago, as "[t]he sick man of Europe" but as a
 strong and dependable power in the west , which can only make the Turks
 proud. The Kemalist objective of rescuing Turkey and the Turkish people
 from history has been accomplished, according to this author, and the
 republic is understood as a positive influence in global affairs - no longer
 simply subject to the will of other governments, but an actor of note in
 itself. The author sought to substantiate this argument by maintaining that
 "we have contributed to the preservation of peace, and we have played a
 constructive role."37 Admiral Giiven Erkaya concurred: "Turkey is proud of
 the role she has been playing in NATO for the maintenance of peace and
 stability in Europe in the last forty years."38 By the same token, Admiral
 Orkunt argued that, by means of the secure border Ankara maintained in
 the face of Soviet expansionism, and as an "advance warning and alarm
 platform," Turkey contributed even more tangibly to the protection of the
 Mediterranean and the Middle East, and thus the western world.39 These
 35 Inan, "Turkey and NATO," 73.
 36 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power poli-
 tics," International Organization 46: 2 (1993): 400.
 37 Inan, "Turkey and NATO," 71, 77.
 38 Giiven Erkaya, "Turkey's defense requirements in the 1990s," Foreign Policy^: 1/2 (1991):
 3i-
 39 Sezai Orkunt, "The interalliance relationship and Turkey," 89.
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 arguments were presented by the intellectuals of statecraft as the reasons
 why Turkey should be considered a significant ally whose contributions
 deserved recognition.
 Other intellectuals of statecraft have also drawn attention to Turkey's
 presence in international politics as a result of its alignment with the west
 and membership in NATO. Necdet Tezel, emphasized the material (i.e.,
 military and geographical) dimension of Turkey's contributions to its role
 within NATO. In an address delivered when he was the undersecretary at
 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1985-86), he noted that
 Among the Western European countries Turkey has the largest
 area. We are one of the five most populated Western European
 countries. Turkey has the largest army in NATO after the United
 States and the largest frontiers with the Warsaw pact among all the
 NATO members.
 Turkey's ability to ensure an effective defense in southern
 flank of NATO and to continue to play the important role as an ele-
 ment of stability in the region is closely connected with the rapid
 development of her economic and military capabilities. Turkey is
 spending great efforts in these fields.
 Turkey spends from her budget each year large sums for
 defense purposes. We are among the leading countries in NATO
 with respect to the share of defense expenditures in the budget and
 in the gross national product.40
 Writing in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Ambassador
 Engin Oba shared a similar view: "Turkey has played a pivotal role in NATO
 and in the defense of Europe and the Middle East."41 Such perspectives
 stressed Turkey's "unique qualities" in the military field defined in terms of
 Turkey's "pivotal role" as an "element of stability" - politically appealing, yet
 vague, expressions. The multiple references to the military dimension of
 the country's role within NATO pointed to Turkey's great responsibility for
 40 Necdet Tezel, "Opening speech in the seminar on eastern Mediterranean security: NATO
 perspectives," Foreign Policy 13: 1/2 (1986): 6.
 41 Engin Oba, "Turkey and western European security in the new era of international relations:
 A political and sociological appraisal," Foreign Policy 17:1 /2 (1993): 54.
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 security on the southern flank. Ankara's disproportionately large defence
 expenditure, given the size of the national economy relative to other NATO
 allies, and as a percentage of gross national product (GNP), was being pre-
 sented by the authors as yet more evidence of Turkey's commitment and
 contribution to the alliance.
 In another article, published in 1986 when the Cold War was already
 winding down, Turkey's geographical location is identified as a significant
 element in according Turkey a special role within the alliance. Its author,
 General Ihsan Giirkan, represented Turkey "as the most critical NATO
 country in the eastern Mediterranean and Southeastern Europe."42 The
 merits brought by Turkey's membership were further presented by the
 founding president of the Foreign Policy Institute and editor of Foreign
 Policy as follows: "Turkey's place within the Alliance makes supply routes
 to Soviet client states in Africa and the Middle East insecure."43 As always,
 however, alliance membership is understood in terms of its contribution to
 Turkey's national identity. This persisted even after the USSR had disap-
 peared from the world stage.
 The basic requirement, which was represented also as the prerequisite
 of Turkish foreign policy, was expressed as catching up with the western
 level of development in the technological, industrial, commercial, and cul-
 tural fields. With reference to Turkey's role in NATO, Ambassador
 Muharrem Nuri Birgi, in a 1993 article, maintained that
 [t]o become part of the community formed by the developed mem-
 bers of the Atlantic Community, which is the brain and main
 source of the present civilization where technology, industry, com-
 merce and culture play an extremely important role, requires an
 early approach to their level of development. Otherwise, there are
 bound to be differences between us, and the effects of these dif-
 ferences will be felt at the most unexpected moments.44
 42 Ihsan Giirkan, "Security environment in the Mediterranean," Foreign Policy 13: 1/2 (1986):
 32.
 43 Seyfi Ta§han, "Turkey's relations with the USA and possible future developments," Foreign
 Policy, 8:1 1 '2 (1980): 22.
 44 Birgi, "Developments within the Atlantic community," 76. See also Soysal, "The influence of
 the concept of western civilisation," 3.
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 Such a message comes out more clearly in the following excerpt from
 an article by Soysal:
 Turkey's participation in the Council of Europe in 1949 and in
 NATO in 1952 are concrete steps in the... direction [of establishing
 Turkey in the Western civilization and democratic order]. With
 these treaties Turkey has undertaken a number of moral commit-
 ments which have to be fulfilled in domestic policies as well as in
 foreign policy.45
 It is worth noting that both authors' words were seemingly addressed
 to a domestic audience, reminding them of the need to conform to western
 standards. (Similar arguments underpin the current pursuit of member-
 ship in the European Union.) That is to say, Turkey's role within NATO,
 according to Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft, has shaped both its domes-
 tic as well as foreign policies.
 What all these statements share in common is that they employed a
 language of commitments, duties, functions, and responsibilities that indi-
 cated expectations of a certain kind of foreign policy behaviour. Turkey's
 role was defined by these writers primarily as both an ally and a promoter
 of security that emphasized military capabilities and responsibilities. In
 this sense, Turkey occupied a position within the social normative structure
 of NATO, as the intellectuals of statecraft conceived it, that entailed partic-
 ular "behavioral norms toward others possessing relevant counter-identi-
 ties."46 Such representations of the Soviet threat in various writings on for-
 eign policy served to locate Turkey in the west, which, in turn, helped to sus-
 tain a pro-western foreign policy during times of crisis (as with Cyprus in
 1967 and 1974) and later during the period of detente.
 CONCLUSION
 It is reasonable to assume that the discourses employed by Turkey's intel-
 lectuals of statecraft in the pages of Foreign Policy have contributed to the
 construction and maintenance of Turkey's western identity during the Cold
 War. It could be surmised that, by employing a standardized discourse on
 45 Soysal, "The influence of the concept of western civilization," 6.
 46 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 227.
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 NATO, a specific understanding of Turkey's identity was internalized and
 institutionalised that, in turn, constituted a guide for diplomatic conduct.
 Such representational practices helped to construct Turkey's state identity
 in the first place with reference to its association with the west and its dif-
 ferences from the east. After defining the self and other (s), Turkish for-
 eign policy toward these actors was shaped accordingly. In an active
 process of interpretation, Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft did not only
 paint a particular picture of what they saw, but also helped to (re)produce
 Turkey's western identity. If this argument is correct, they helped to sus-
 tain and legitimize a pro-western foreign policy and Turkey's membership
 to NATO even after the Soviet threat of the immediate post-war period lost
 its immediacy.
 It is difficult to know the degree to which the intellectuals of statecraft,
 whose voices were heard through the medium of Foreign Policy were able
 to influence actual foreign policy making in Turkey. In one sense, this was
 not what they primarily aimed for. Although the Foreign Policy Institute
 was established as a think tank to provide intellectual back up to foreign
 policy making in Turkey, its primary aim, as stated by its core members, has
 been to shape public opinion:
 What is important is that public debate focuses on the issue at
 hand and public opinion is formed, indeed, guided by the FPI pro-
 nouncements and publications. This is the measure of the effec-
 tiveness of a think-tank that we can refer to in our assessments. In
 this regard, we feel that FPI has excelled.47
 Stated as such, the Foreign Policy Institute's criteria for excellence, that
 of shaping public opinion in line with the existing line of policymaking, is
 even more difficult to measure than its influence on actual policymaking.
 Having said that, the evidence presented in this article has revealed that the
 contributors to Foreign Policy also seemed very interested in providing sup-
 port to existing policymaking. This comes out clearly in their writings on
 the enduring Soviet threat that were published during the detente era, or
 those writings that stressed Turkey's contributions to the Atlantic alliance at
 47 AN L. Karaosmanoglu and Ersin Onulduran, "Seyfi Ta§han, Foreign Policy Institute and the
 genesis of think-tank culture in Turkey," in Contemporary Issues in International Politics: Essays
 in Honour of Seyfi Tashan (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004), 3.
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 a time when public opinion grew critical of ties with the west in general and
 the United States in particular. While further research is obviously
 required, it can be hypothesized that Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft con-
 tributed to sustaining a pro-western foreign policy, and that they were an
 indirect yet nevertheless significant influence on foreign policy making in
 Turkey.
 Finally, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that an analysis of texts
 by the intellectuals of statecraft of Turkey's bid to join the European Union
 will likely produce a similar conclusion, for throughout the republican era,
 the issue of membership in western institutions has witnessed the intellec-
 tuals of statecraft articulating Turkey's western identity as well as insecuri-
 ties and interests.48 Although the role played today by the intellectuals of
 statecraft remains unchanged, an increase in the public's interest in for-
 eign and security policy issues has meant a new challenge to the authori-
 ty of their writings. Recently, new actors in Turkey's developing civil soci-
 ety have become more willing to speak about issues of foreign and securi-
 ty policy - areas that had previously been a preserve of the intellectuals of
 statecraft. This is not only due to an increase in the business elite's inter-
 est in foreign and security policy,49 but is also due to the process of global-
 ization, which has empowered nongovernmental actors in general. The
 emergence of an alternative security discourse employed by these new
 actors suggests that the intellectuals of statecraft might be compelled to
 face the challenge posed by the new actors' competing accounts on foreign
 and security policy issues.50 The full implications of this development on
 policymaking remain to be seen.
 48 Pinar Bilgin, "The 'peculiarity' of Turkey's position on EU-NATO military/security coopera-
 tion: A rejoinder to Missiroli," Security Dialogue 34:3 (2003): 343.
 49 Gencer Ozcan, "Turkiye Dis, Politikasinda Algilamalar, Karar Alma ve Olu§um Sureci"
 [Perceptions, decision-making and implementation in Turkey's foreign policy] in Faruk
 Sonmezoglu, ed., Turk Dis Politikasinin Analizi (The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy)
 (Istanbul: Der, 2004): 857-66; and Ziya Onis. ve Umut Turem, "Business, globalisation and
 democracy: A comparative analysis of Turkish business associations," Turkish Studies 2:2
 (2001): 94-120.
 50 Pinar Bilgin, "Turkey's changing security discourses: The challenge of globalisation,"
 European Journal of Political Research 44 (2005): 175-201.
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